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by Professor Ronald Filler
Ronald Filler is a Professor of Law and
the Director of the Financial Services
Law Institute at New York Law School
(“NYLS”). He has taught courses on
Derivatives Law, Securities Regulation,
the Regulation of Broker-Dealers and
FCMs and other financial law issues
since 1977. Prof. Filler is a Public
Director and Member of the Executive
Committee of the National Futures As-
sociation, a Public Director and
Member of the Regulatory Oversight
Committee (“ROC”) of SwapEX, a swap
execution facility owned by the State
Street Corporation, is a Public Director
of Bcause, a proposed new DCM and
DCO that deals in virtual currencies,
and is a Board Member of GCSA, a
company that is offering insurance and
collateral management facilities to
CCPs around the globe to strengthen
their financial resources, especially in
the event of a default. Before joining the
NYLS faculty in 2008, he was a Manag-
ing Director in the Capital Markets
Prime Services Division at Lehman
Brothers Inc. in its New York
headquarters. Prof. Filler has co-
authored, with Prof. Jerry Markham, a
law book on “Regulation of Derivative
Financial Instruments (Swaps, Options
and Futures),” published by West Aca-
demic in May 2014 and an Amicus Brief
filed with the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S.
v. Michael Coscia (Docket No. 17-1099).
Prof. Filler provides expert witness
testimony and consulting services relat-
ing to a variety of issues involving the
financial services industry. You can
reach Prof. Filler via email at: ronald.fil
ler@nyls.edu
INTRODUCTION
In a highly controversial and unusual
opinion, Judge Kimba Wood, writing for
the Second Circuit, held in Tower Re-
search Capital that the matching of trades
at night on the CME Globex platform of
the KOSPI 200 Futures Contracts traded
on the Korean Exchange (“KRX”) gives
five Korean traders the right to bring a
“spoofing” allegation against Tower Re-
search Capital (“Tower”), a hedge fund.1
The opinion noted that Tower traded
4,000,000 trades of the KOSPI contract
on Globex in 2012, which represented ap-
proximately 54% of the market share,
whereas these five Korean traders traded
1,000 such contracts in 2012.2 All of the
trades at issue were deemed to be “night
trades.” For the KOSPI contract, even
though it is cleared at KRX, the CME
agreed to allow KRX to use its CME
Globex platform to execute and “match”
these night trades as the KRX did not of-
fer any such night trading platforms. The
federal district court in this case issued
two decisions,3 both of which denied the
Plaintiffs’ claims, citing Morrison.4
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The allegations brought by the Plaintiffs in-
volve “spoofing” by the Defendants as their large
market share and high frequency trading alleg-
edly caused injury to the Plaintiffs.5 Even though
the Plaintiffs could not prove that the Defendants
were on the opposite side of any of their KOSPI
orders placed via Globex, they argued that, given
the fact that the Defendants placed 4,000,000
orders on Globex in 2012, statistically, one or
more of the Plaintiffs’ orders had to be matched
by the Defendants.
In Morrison, the U.S. Supreme Court denied
that Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. 78j(b), or SEC Rule 10b-5,
applied to extraterritorial securities transactions
unless it can be proven that such transactions (1)
were listed on a domestic exchange, or (2) were
domestic transactions in other securities.6 Mor-
rison was strictly a securities case and did not
involve the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”),
7 U.S.C.A. 1 et seq., or any regulation promul-
gated by the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission (“CFTC”). The federal district court in
this case, citing Morrison, reasoned that the
Defendants’ alleged conduct was within the ter-
ritorial reach of the CEA only if these KOSPI
contracts were purchased or sold in the United
States or were listed on a domestic exchange.7
The district court noted that these KOSPI orders
were placed in Korea, and not in the U.S., and
the fact that they were merely matched on
Globex, which is located in Illinois, were final
only when cleared the next day in South Korea.8
The district court then held that, while the CME
is a domestic exchange, its Globex platform is
not.9 Therefore, no trading took place on a “do-
mestic” exchange.
MORRISON ANALOGY
The Second Circuit took issue on a number of
points set forth in the district court’s two opinions
and reversed and remanded them back to the
district court. The first point was that Morrison
did not apply to the CEA or to futures contracts.10
It did cite another Second Circuit decision, Logi-
novskaya11, that applied Morrison to the CEA but
distinguished Loginovskaya on the grounds that
it did not involve a trade on a futures domestic
exchange.12 The Court focused on another case,
Absolute Activist,13 that it held did apply to a case
involving the CEA.14 In Absolute Activist, the
Second Circuit concluded that a transaction
involving securities is a “domestic transaction”
under Morrison if “irrevocable liability is in-
curred or title passes within the United States.”15
This “irrevocable liability” test proved to be the
main reason why the Second Circuit reversed the
lower court’s decisions.
The Second Circuit stated:
“Irrevocable liability attaches ‘when the parties
to the transaction are committed to one another’
or ‘in the classic contractual sense, there is a
meeting of the minds of the parties.’ ’’16
The Court then held that there is a plausible
possibility that, when these night trades in the
KOSPI contract are matched here in the U.S., the
parties might incur irrevocable liability.17 Since
this was sufficient to resolve the extraterritorial
jurisdictional issue, the Court chose not to con-
sider whether Globex was a domestic exchange.18
The key analysis by the Second Circuit was its
refusal to apply Morrison to the CEA. It stated:
“. . . the district court and the parties seemed to
assume that Morrison’s ‘domestic exchange’
prong applies to the CEA either to broaden or to
narrow its extraterritorial reach.”19
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It then noted:
“The section of the CEA relevant to a territorial
analysis . . . does not contain the language simi-
lar to the language in § 10(b) that led Morrison
to craft the ‘domestic exchange’ prong.”20
“Plainly, the reasoning of Morrison does not
preclude the application of the CEA to trades
made on a foreign exchange when irrevocable li-
ability is incurred in the United States.”21
The Second Circuit then held that, even though
the trades would be cleared in Korea, there was
the plausibility that such irrevocable liability
could result from the matching of the orders on
Globex as the CME claims that matched orders
are “binding contracts.”22 It then held that there
are two transactions, namely the matching of the
orders on Globex and the clearing of the orders
on KRX, that apply here.23
ANALYSIS OF THIS OPINION
The Second’s Circuit complete focus on one
aspect of Morrison ignores the method as to how
the global futures markets are traded. The futures
markets are indeed global. Foreign boards of
trades have been given exemptions from the
CFTC for many years to allow its terminals to be
placed here in the U.S. without first being re-
quired to register as a “domestic contract
exchange.”24 Similarly, U.S. futures exchanges
are allowed to place their terminals abroad.
Orders are merely matched via these terminals. I
am not aware that any other case has ever formed
the basis for any action against any defendant on
an exchange terminal. Query, does the mere
matching of orders on these terminals actually
create the irrevocable liability that the Second
Circuit has stated? I do not think so. A futures
contract must be both executed and cleared, in
my opinion, to be irrevocable.25In Tower Re-
search Capital, the clearing component clearly
took place outside the U.S. Query, in order to
invoke jurisdiction under the CEA, shouldn’t
both functions take place in the U.S.? Moreover,
there is no liability imposed on Globex or on any
brokerage firm that provides any of these termi-
nals to their customers unless the customer can
prove “gross negligence.” Maintaining a large
market share, as what was alleged in this case by
the Plaintiffs, does not, on its face, prove this
higher standard of liability.
Therefore, how will such irrevocable liability
ever be proven. If these Plaintiffs, or others who
may become part of a proposed class action, were
harmed in any way by the Defendants, then let
them bring an action in South Korea.
Moreover, CEA Section 4b(d) specifically
states that the anti-fraud provision of the CEA
does not apply to “any activity that occurs on a
board of trade, exchange or clearinghouse
. . ...located outside the United States . . .
involving any contract of sale of a commodity
for future delivery . . ..”26 Section 4c(a)(5) of
the CEA, which was added by the Dodd-Frank
Act in July 2010, further states that the “disrup-
tive practices” section only applies to “any trad-
ing, practice, or conduct on or subject to the rules
of a registered entity . . ..”27 It appears that the
Second Circuit completely ignored these two
important sections of the CEA. As noted above,
it did not address the issue as to whether CME
Globex was or was not registered with the CFTC,
which the federal district court noted that it was
not so registered.
Finally, the Second Circuit also completely
ignored Section 22(a)(1)(D) of the CEA, which
clearly only authorizes a private right of action
for actual damages against persons that employ
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“any manipulative device . . . in connection with
. . . a commodity . . . for future delivery on or
subject to the rules of any registered entity.”28
This CEA section does not authorize any private
rights of actions regarding any “spoofing” allega-
tion under Section 4c(a)(5) and only applies to
any manipulative behavior under Section 6(c)(1)
of the CEA.29The Plaintiffs in Tower Research
Capital are seeking monetary damages that al-
legedly resulted from “spoofing” actions taken
by the Defendants in that case. There is thus no
express private right of action under Section 22
of the CEA for the Plaintiffs in Tower Research
Capital to allege as the trades did not take place
on a registered entity. Moreover, arguably, there
is no implied private right of action either.
CONCLUSION
The District Court on remand in analyzing the
merits of this case should find that there was no
irrevocable liability by the Defendants, based on
what was noted above but also on my belief that
”spoofing” is an unconstitutionally vague term.30
Moreover, the federal district court needs to ad-
dress the other legal issues noted herein involv-
ing Sections 4b, 4c(5), 6(c)1)and 22(a)(1)(D) of
the CEA. Presumably, this case against Tower
Research Capital will be dismissed once again.
© Ronald H. Filler
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